Actually, what accounts for the determinative difference between Dasein and den Enkelte is the voluntary, more specifically, resolution. Moreover, it is suggested that due to the primacy of its office, .resolution can even be termed the personal center of both modes of existence. Resolution is the determinative factor in that it is through this phenomenon that Dasein and den Enkelte can attest the truth of their being, that is, authentic existence.
However, the authenticity of their existence cannot be homogeneous because in the case of Dasein existence is capable of being understood by itself, whereas in the case of den Enkelte it cannot. The upshot is that an existence which finds its measure of truth in itself and one which does not are heterogeneous.
Consequently, this radical dissimilarity renders it impossible for the one to be derived from the other. Hence, Buber's allegation that "Heidegger secularizes the Single One of Kierkegaard, that is, he severs the relation to the absolute for which Kierkegaard's man becomes a Single One,"* makes sense only if it is understood that by virtue of this very secularization, the one cannot be derived from the other. In this paper I shall argue that Heidegger's Dasein can neither derive from, nor be a secularization of, Kierkegaard's den Enkelte.
It is obvious that the locutions "derives from" and "is a secularization of" or "secularizes" are key terms in this essay and as such deserve closer consideration. First of all, "derives from" implies the category of substance and answers to the question, "Derives from what?". "To be a secularization of" or "to secularize" implies that there is a religious prototype or model. Such a prototype, in the act of self-determination, acknowledges a transcendent absolute by virtue of which it assumes its particular identity. Without this transcendent factor, it would logically and ontologically be otherwise.
If we approach the issue from the point of view of a model, that is, regard it isomorphically, then in fact we are pointing to the possibility of a duplication.
It goes without saying, however, that a model thus configured, if at all duplicated, cannot yi.eld a secular version, that is, a being whose act of self-determination excludes the transcendence in question.
Nevertheless, Buber, when carefully analyzed, tends to impress upon us the idea that Heidegger conceptually abused Kierkegaard's model. Buber leaves us with the impression that Dasein is a deficient version of a substantial form: as if den Enkelte has all the attributes and Dasein only some; as if den Enkelte, mutatis mutandis, has the right relations and Dasein not.
It is true that the allegation notwithstanding, Buber did not attempt to demonstrate the process of secularization whereby Heidegger's man came into being. At best he contends that by nature and in virtue of his situation, man has a three-fold living relation: a relation to the world and to things, a relation to men-both to individuals and to the many-a relation to the mystery of being. Then Buber points out that the relation to things is virtually lacking in Kierkegaard whereas in Heidegger there is such a relation albeit only a technical, purposive one.
But considering a thing merely in its applicability to a definite aim, i.e., its technical suitability, does not allow for an "essential" relation with it. For the technical aspect of the thing does not exhaust its "essential life." For example, a man may gaze without purpose on a tree, and another may look at it with a view to making a stick from the best branch. If man relates to things only technically he shortchanges himself for the simple reason that the whole reality of the thing has escaped him.
Concerning the relation to individual men, Buber charges that to Kierkegaard it is a doubtful thing because of the exclusivity required by a God-relationship. But while he admits the presence of such a relation in Heidegger, because it is one of solicitude only, it cannot be essential. On the other hand, the connexion with the faceless, formless, nameless many, with the "crowd," with the "one," is acknowledged in Birault referred above. "Time, or rather the temporalization of time," i.e., Zeitlichkeit, is essentially "outside of itself," to boot, is "externality as such." Temporality engulfs everything in its ecstatic structure, leaving nothing outside of itself, for it is its own externality in the form of extendedness. Therefore, Wyschogrod observes, the dissolution of Being into timeliness, where the latter is a field of extendedness (Dasein), directly relates to the basic experience of dread.
As he puts it, "Heidegger's dread is a dread on behalf of a Self that is not something other than dread but dread itself." And if there is nothing besides temporality, then Dasein is verily trapped; for the necessary condition for Entschlossenheit is Angst, and the call of conscience, however benevolent in its salvific office, functions in terms of Dasein's guilt, which is grounded in nullity or finitude.
But if the basic feature of Dasein is his Being-inthe-world, then with death this same "Being-in-theworld is at stake." 1 ' For temporality, which is the transcendental structure of Dasein, is also the "meaning," i.e., the "whereto" (Woraufhin) of the primary project, which consists of a "being-in and a being- In this mode death is regarded not so much as an empirical certainty but as a possibility.
As such, it concerns Dasein directly, in his first-personal immediacy.
If the emphasis is on death as possibility, the point, then, is not to brood over it in the hope of knowing the exact moment of its actualization, thereby taking away its character as a possibility, but rather, "it must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with it as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves towards it 1 *" (BT 306 Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towardsdeath--a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the "they", and'which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious. (BT 311) Anxiety sustains anticipation, anticipation individualizes Dasein, and since the process of individuation is one in which Dasein is released from the grand illusions of anonymity, Dasein is left in the purity of his solus ip_se. In this pristine mode of being he is authentically himself. Wherefore the corollary to the above quotation:
Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost potentiality-forBeing--that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence.
Authenticity
is a thorny problem in the early Heidegger because of the unresolved tension between the authentic!ty-inauthenticity correlation (hence the denial that it is "some concrete possible idea of exis- We have dwelt enough on Heideggerian authenticity to be able now to contrast adequately Dasein and den Enkelte.
The tension just referred to between the authenticity--inauthenticity correlation and authenticity as an ideal makes only minimal difference.
For in either form of authenticity, Dasein maintains his ontological structure as constituted by temporality, and it is with the self-constitution of temporality that the principle of den Enkelte is fundamentally at variance.
It should be recalled that Kierkegaard, in "A First and Last Declaration" at the conclusion of the Con- 
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It is obvious that we cannot go on to eternity on this subject, not so much because of its nature as such, as that it can easily lure us to be unwilling custodians of a kettle of fish. What the above citations have done is to connect unequivocally eternity with the New Testament and the doctrine of creation, thus paving the way for den Enkelte. Now it is an understatement to say that Kierkegaard knew both Greek philosophy and the New Testament very well.
He was rather au fait with them. The interesting thing now is to observe what he can do with the conceptual categories of both worlds. And if eternity as understood by the Greeks is unlike eternity within the Christian context, then the dissimilarity becomes evident with the personae themselves.
The first thing to notice is that in the world of Soren Kierkegaard "the eternal" is applied to both God and man.
But "it will become evident that he means different things when he uses 'eternal' of man and God. It is the most abstract of all things, and yet at the same time it is the most concrete -it is freedom.** Johannes Climacus:
The goal of movement for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision, and to renew it. The eternal is extraneous to the movement of life, and a concrete eternity within the existing individual is the maximum degree of his passion.* The self is composed of infinity and finitiness. But the synthesis is a relationship, and it is a relationship which, though it is derived, relates itself to itself, which means freedom. The self is freedom. (SD 162) The self is the factor of continuity throughout the changes of becoming. The self is that which changes, yet it is not the case "that the self is comprised of self-identical (unchanging) substratum (substance) in which constantly changing experiences (accidents) inhere."** What constitutes the structure of the self in Judge William and Anti-Climacus, of man in Haufniensis, and of the existing individual in Johannes Climacus, is freedom. Properly speaking, then, the self is freedom. Therefore,' the pseudonyms concur that what is eternal in the self is freedom.
In time the self actualizes its possibilities, and these possibilities-become-actualities in turn engender their own possibilities.
What is not subject to change, because it is outside the realm of time, is freedom.
Freedom here is not an attribute inherent in some substance.
It is the very being of the self. And since the actualization of possibilities (which is a process of becoming) presupposes freedom as a constant factor, the self and man and the existing individual are characterized as temporal and eternal, each becoming what he ijs. Such is "eternal" when applied to man: it is the presupposition of his very self-actualization.
But if self-actualization occurs through the eternal in time, and these two factors are held to be qualitatively different, then how account for the contiguity presupposed by their co-presence in man? Haufniensis' answer: "The instant is that ambiguous moment in which time and eternity touch one another, thereby positing the temporal, where time is constantly intersecting eternity and eternity constantly permeating time"
(CD 80). To Climacus, "the Eternal, which hitherto did not exist, came into existence in this moment," and "in the Moment man becomes conscious that he is born; for his antecedent state, to which he may not cling, was one of non-being."*' And Climacus gives to the moment the distinctive name:
the Fullness of Time, by which he means Christ as the absolute paradox. Following the same line of thought, Jean Wahl writes: "L'eternel a un commencement et un achievement tempore 1. Ce qui est eternel, un instant auparavant n'etait pas"* 7 (The eternal has a beginning and a temporal conclusion. That which is eternal a moment ago was not).
These are expressions for the entrance of the eternal into the temporal "at the opportune moment for decision": "man, not being born eternal, becomes eternal;" and "man becomes conscious of himself as being born anew."** Haufniensis, making reference to the concept of Kairos in Christianity, writes: "The concept around which everything turns in Christianity, the concept which makes all things new, is the fullness of time, is the instant as eternity, and yet this eternity is at once the future and the past" (CD 81). The past here is not a concatenation of objectified nows which have congealed in the flux of time and are now irrevocably "out there" in the objective order of things. The past is retained in memory as present possibilities, for they serve as condition for present action.
Schrag, with characteristic lucidity, elaborates:
"The cardinal significance of the Christevent is that it is a contemporaneous reality in the Christian's personal decision. Christ's coming is not to be identified with an objectivized and fixed historical incident. Rather it expresses a repeatable possibility. Christ 'comes again' in each Let the world give him everything, it is possible that he will see fit to accept it. But he says: "Oh, well," and this "Oh, well" means the absolute respect for the absolute telos.
If the world takes everything from him, he suffers no doubt; but he says again: "Oh, well"--and this "Oh, well" means the absolute respect for the absolute telos. So finite are we that we cannot, of our own resolution and will, bring ourselves originally face to face with Nothing.
So bottomlessly does finalization dig into existence that our freedom's peculiar and profoundest finality fails.
Admittedly, "Being can only happen through the activity of men, but no activistic, voluntaristic act of the will can force a revelation of being."" And yet, it is in the mode of inauthentic everydayness that dread reveals being as nothing. "So bottomlessly does finalization dig into existence that our freedom's peculiar and profoundest finality fails." A beautiful sentence, this. And the insight is a courageous one, but its courage is not undergirded by the healthy possibility of Anti-Climacus' personality, where "the condition of its survival is therefore analogous to breathing (respiration), which is an inand an a-spiration" (SD 173).
God, regarded as "the one for whom all things are possible," is the source of the believer's "sound health of faith," that is, possibility (SD 175). Yet, although God is defined by Anti-Climacus as possibility, and man as a synthesis of possibility and necessity, there is a qualitative difference between them. Man's possibilities configure in his imagination, and God is "the power which makes possible the imagination of possibilities . . . God is the possibility which comes to man even when his imagination can no longer conjure up a possibility as his own possibility." 57 God, so considered, enables us to discern a similarity between Anti-Climacus' believer and Kierkegaard's den Enkelte. For in the Journals and Papers Kierkegaard writes:
"The Single Individual (den Enkelte): this principle can be set forth only in a poetic way, for it would be presumptuous for anyone to pass himself off as being eminently 'The Single Individual'. Consequently it is a striving." 5 * The condition for this striving is God, for whom all things are possible.
In 
